Marine Superintendent

The role of the Marine Superintendent

Module objectivePosition the Marine Superintendent within a ship-management organisation, distinguish it from adjacent shore-based roles and identify its principal interfaces.

The Marine Superintendent is a shore role whose scope is defined by the company. Marine duties typically concern navigation, cargo and operational safety; technical duties concern machinery, maintenance and dry-docking. These roles may be combined but are not synonyms for Fleet Manager. This course covers their interfaces: actual duties and authority must be checked against the SMS, organisation chart and management agreement.

Technical, Marine and Fleet Superintendent: scopes compared

Titles vary from company to company. In structured organisations, the typical distinction is as follows:

Position within the organisation

In a typical organisational configuration, the Marine/Technical Superintendent may report to the Fleet or Technical Director and maintains functional interfaces with other shore functions and the assigned ships. The ISM Code does not prescribe this organisation chart: responsibilities, authority, interrelations and lines of communication must be defined and documented in the company’s Safety Management System.

The DPA has direct access to the highest level of management (ISM Code, §4). The Code does not establish a predefined hierarchical relationship between the DPA and the Superintendent: authority and interrelations depend on the organisation documented by the company, without limiting the DPA’s direct access to top management.

On board, the Master retains overriding authority and responsibility to make the decisions necessary for safety and pollution prevention and to request the company’s assistance when required (ISM Code, §5.2).

IMO explains that the Code is expressed in broad terms because companies, organisational structures and operating conditions may differ. Official IMO page on the ISM Code ↗

Indicative organisational diagram: roles, authority and lines of communication depend on the company’s SMS.

Span of control: how many ships?

The number of ships a superintendent can manage (span of control) depends on vessel type, age, operating area and technical complexity. An excessive workload is a well-known latent factor in accidents: it reduces time on board and the quality of oversight. An example of how to frame it, to be defined on the fleet profile:

Superintendent KPIs

Role performance is measured on a balanced scorecard across safety, technical and economic dimensions. A good KPI set avoids rewarding cost savings at the expense of safety:

Verification sources: ISM Code, §§1.1.10, 3–5, 9–10, 12–14 ↗

International regulatory architecture

Module objectiveNavigate the hierarchy between IMO conventions, class rules and flag legislation, and know which certificate is at stake in any decision.

The ship lives within a network of international conventions, mandatory codes, class rules and flag legislation. The superintendent must move confidently through this hierarchy to know, in every decision, «who has the final say» and which certificate is at stake.

Key international conventions

The Flag – Class – Port State triangle

Three different parties oversee the ship's compliance, with distinct roles the superintendent must keep separate:

• Flag Administration (Flag State): holder of sovereignty over the ship; issues or authorises statutory certificates and sets national requirements. Often delegates verifications to a Recognized Organization.
• Classification society / RO: verifies compliance with its own class rules (structure, machinery) and, as an RO, carries out statutory verifications on behalf of the flag. Issues the class certificate.
• Port State Control (PSC): the port State inspects foreign ships to verify compliance with conventions; can detain the ship (detention). It does not «manage» the ship: it controls it.

The MLC is an ILO convention, not an IMO convention. Each instrument depends on ship type, tonnage, voyages, dates and flag State: this list does not require every certificate on every ship. An RO acts only within flag authorisation; the Administration retains oversight responsibility.

Verification sources: ISM Code, §§1.1.10, 3–5, 9–10, 12–14 ↗ · Hong Kong Convention, Art. 3; Reg. 5 ↗

ISM Code and Safety Management System leadership

Module objectiveRecognise the structure of the ISM Code, the relationship between DOC and SMC, and the cycle of non-conformity, corrective action and Management of Change.

The ISM Code (SOLAS Ch. IX) has been mandatory since 1998 for the first categories and since 2002 for the further categories specified by SOLAS IX. It requires every company to have a documented and verified Safety Management System (SMS). In practice, the superintendent is the main «engine» of the SMS at ship level: feeding it, verifying it and improving it.

Structure of the Code

The Code is organised into functional elements that define responsibilities, procedures and improvement cycles. Operational summary:

DOC and SMC

The Document of Compliance (DOC) certifies the company's system for the ship types it manages; the Safety Management Certificate (SMC) certifies the individual ship. The DOC must be verified annually; the SMC has a five-year cycle with an intermediate verification. The superintendent monitors deadlines and verifications: an expired SMC commercially immobilises the ship.

Non-conformities, corrective actions and Management of Change

The SMS virtuous cycle is: detection (audit, inspection, near-miss) → root cause analysis → corrective action → effectiveness verification. The superintendent must distinguish correction (putting out the fire) from corrective action (preventing recurrence), avoiding a formal «patch-up» closure that leaves the root cause intact.

• Non-conformity (NC): deviation from requirements. A major NC that seriously threatens safety or the environment can lead to withdrawal/suspension of the certificate.
• Corrective action (CAPA): addresses the cause; its effectiveness must be verified over time, not just its implementation.
• Management of Change (MoC): every change to equipment, procedures, crew or operations must be assessed for the risks it introduces before being implemented. It is the weakest link most often found in real systems.

Under ISM, a major non-conformity also includes lack of effective and systematic implementation of a requirement (§1.1.10), not only an immediate threat. Ordinary DOCs and SMCs last at most five years: DOC annual verification is within ±3 months of the anniversary; an SMC requires at least one intermediate verification, between its second and third anniversaries if only one is conducted. Interim certificates follow §14. Internal audits on board and ashore must be no more than 12 months apart, with at most three additional months in exceptional circumstances (§12.1), not a routine extension.

Verification sources: ISM Code, §§1.1.10, 3–5, 9–10, 12–14 ↗

Advanced technical management and maintenance

Module objectiveChoose between the four maintenance strategies according to equipment criticality, and govern the PMS, critical systems and the spares policy that follows.

Maintenance is the economic and safety heart of technical management. The superintendent does not «repair»: they design and govern a maintenance strategy that keeps the ship reliable, compliant and available at the lowest life-cycle cost.

The four maintenance strategies

No strategy is «the best» in absolute terms: the choice depends on the criticality of the equipment, redundancy and the availability of condition data.

Matrix of maintenance strategies for critical machinery.

Planned Maintenance System (PMS)

The PMS organises maintenance tasks, due dates and records within the SMS. A class-approved PMS scheme may change how specified machinery is surveyed under the society’s rules; it does not automatically replace class or statutory surveys. The superintendent checks coverage, overdue tasks, evidence and spares.

Critical equipment and critical spares

The ISM Code (§10.3) requires identifying equipment and technical systems whose sudden failure could create hazardous situations, and taking specific measures to promote their reliability, including regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment not in continuous use. On that basis the company defines in its own SMS and PMS which critical spares to keep on board or readily available: the list follows from risk assessment, redundancy, makers' instructions and class rules, not from the text of the Code. The availability of critical spares is a safety KPI, not just a logistical one.

Verification sources: ISM Code, §§1.1.10, 3–5, 9–10, 12–14 ↗ · IACS, III 5/INF.27; PR35 ↗

Class and survey management

Module objectivePlan statutory and class surveys by certificate and interpret Conditions of Class and Recommendations under the applicable rules.

The ship maintains class and statutory certificates through a cycle of surveys. Managing this cycle — anticipating windows and requirements — avoids class suspensions and commercial downtime. It is a distinctive competence of the technical superintendent.

The harmonised regime (HSSC)

HSSC harmonises statutory surveys and certification; many cargo-ship certificates have a maximum five-year duration. The Passenger Ship Safety Certificate instead has a maximum 12-month duration. Annual, intermediate and periodical surveys depend on the certificate. The class cycle (Special Survey, annuals, CMS) remains separate, although it can be coordinated with statutory surveys.

Five-year survey cycle under the harmonised regime (indicative diagram).

Conditions of Class and Recommendations

A Condition of Class requires work or verification by a deadline to maintain class. Recommendation may be the equivalent term used by a society for that same requirement: it must not automatically be treated as optional. Remarks and memoranda are interpreted under applicable rules. Record the requirement, deadline and formal closure; effects of suspension on certificates, insurance and chartering require checks with the flag, insurers and contract.

Verification sources: A.1207(34), HSSC 2025, §§3–5 ↗ · IACS, III 5/INF.27; PR35 ↗

Dry-dock management

Module objectiveSet up a dry-dock campaign as a project: critical path, repair specification, tendering, yard supervision and post-dock closure.

Dry-docking is a significant project in terms of cost, downtime and safety. It needs a budget, schedule, suppliers and risk controls proportionate to the work; it is not necessarily the most expensive event in a ship’s life.

The project's critical path

A well-managed dry-dock starts months before entering the dock. Long lead-time activities (spares, yard selection) must start well in advance so as not to become the bottleneck.

Typical critical path of a dry-dock campaign (indicative diagram, weeks).

Preparing the specification and tender

The repair specification is the contractual document that describes every job in detail, quantity and standard. An ambiguous specification is the leading cause of extra costs at the yard. Yard selection balances price, location, technical capability, availability and reputation.

Site control and post-dock

During the works, the superintendent (or the site team) oversees progress, quality, safety and, above all, growth work: additional jobs that emerge in the dock, which must be approved in writing with an agreed price before execution. The post-dock report closes the project: final cost/time reconciliation, lessons learned, warranties to activate.

Before work: coordinate ship and yard on energy isolation, permits, enclosed spaces, hot work, stability and simultaneous operations. Before return to service: complete functional tests, required class/flag checks, permit closure and documented acceptance. Price agreement does not replace these checks.

Port State Control

Module objectiveUnderstand how the MoUs select ships for inspection and what turns a deficiency into a detention.

Port State Control is the system by which port States inspect foreign ships to enforce international conventions. A detention costs off-hire, reputation and charterers' attention. The superintendent works to ensure PSC inspections close without detainable deficiencies.

The MoUs and regional regimes

Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU coordinate regional regimes; the USCG operates a separate regime. Flag lists, RO assessments and company performance are not the same ranking: use the methodology, period and criteria of the relevant regime.

Ship Risk Profile and targeting

Within Paris MoU, the HRS/SRS/LRS profile contributes to selection. Periodic windows are 5–6, 10–12 and 24–36 months: the ship becomes eligible (Priority II) at the opening and Priority I beyond the limit. Overriding and unexpected factors may trigger earlier inspections with different levels of obligation. Inspection type also depends on category, age, clear grounds and circumstances; the profile alone does not describe the whole process.

Ship risk profile under the Paris MoU (indicative diagram).

Deficiencies and detention

Deficiencies are classified by severity; some require rectification before departure, others within a set period, and the most serious result in detention. Recurring detention areas include fire safety, life-saving appliances, ISM («systemic» deficiencies revealing a purely formal SMS), MLC and the engine room.

Table 7.1 — Paris MoU PSC action codes, extract (PSCC59/2026/03, Annex 1; each regime uses its own coding). Detention has no numeric code: it is recorded with the «Grounds for detention» tick box alongside the deficiency.

Distinguish the deficiency code, action code and detention indication. Detention and release are decisions of the PSC authority: a flag or authorised-RO audit alone does not permit departure. The decision also considers the combined effect of deficiencies and voyage conditions.

Verification sources: Paris MoU, Annexes 7–9 ↗ · PSCC59/2026/03, Annex 1 ↗

Vetting and SIRE 2.0

Module objectiveRecognise what changes with SIRE 2.0 and how vetting and TMSA determine commercial access to the tanker market.

In the tanker world (oil, chemical, gas) access to chartering runs through vetting: oil major companies assess a ship's suitability before entrusting it with cargo. The central tool is OCIMF's SIRE programme. A ship that is not «vettable» is, in practice, commercially excluded from that market.

SIRE 2.0: the new regime

Since 2 September 2024 SIRE 2.0 is the OCIMF programme that replaced VIQ7. It is not an incremental update: it generates a CVIQ tailored to the ship and combines different question types, response tools, evidence and observations, with greater attention to human and organisational factors.

The vetting ecosystem and TMSA

SIRE does not exist in isolation. TMSA (Tanker Management and Self Assessment) is the tool with which the company self-assesses and improves its management system by element (KPIs and best practices at progressive levels). For chemical tankers there is also the CDI scheme. The superintendent oversees both the outcome of individual inspections and the system maturity measured by TMSA.

SIRE 2.0 provides inspection information: it does not issue an OCIMF pass/fail or universal commercial approval. Each recipient makes its own vetting decision. Hardware, procedures and human factors are programme dimensions, not necessarily three assessments in every question. Operator comments and actions do not automatically erase observations from the report.

Verification sources: OCIMF, SIRE 2.0 ↗

OPEX budgeting and cost control

Module objectiveBuild and monitor an OPEX budget, recognise its cost drivers and carry out variance analysis.

The superintendent oversees the OPEX items assigned under company delegations. Managing OPEX means building a realistic budget, monitoring variances and acting on cost drivers without compromising safety and compliance.

The structure of OPEX

Daily OPEX (often expressed as cost per day) groups together recurring management items. The breakdown varies by ship type and flag, but crew costs are almost always the dominant item:

Indicative breakdown of daily OPEX (dry-cargo vessel).

Budget cycle and variance analysis

The typical cycle: annual budget (bottom-up from the ship + top-down from the company) → monthly/quarterly monitoring → variance analysis → updated forecast → review. Variance analysis distinguishes causes (price, volume, timing) to avoid wrong conclusions.

Budget responsibility follows company delegations. This OPEX example excludes voyage fuel, port costs, financing and investments; dry-docking and major maintenance follow the accounting policy. The total is €7,390 → €7,830/day: +440, or +5.95%. Maintenance is the largest variance (+350), but attribution to a failure requires evidence and cannot be inferred from numbers alone.

Decarbonisation and environmental compliance

Module objectiveDistinguish applicable EEXI/CII, EU ETS and FuelEU requirements from parameters still proposed in the Net-Zero Framework.

The superintendent distinguishes applicable requirements, adopted rules with future effective dates and proposals. This review is dated 14 September 2026; before operational decisions check the ship, voyage, competent authority and official version.

Starting point: EEXI and CII

Two instruments already in force stem from MARPOL Annex VI: the EEXI (Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index), a technical requirement on the design efficiency of the existing ship; and the CII (Carbon Intensity Indicator), an annual operational indicator that assigns the ship a rating from A to E based on actual carbon intensity, with a reduction line that tightens over time.

CII rating bands and reduction line (indicative diagram).

A ship rated D for three consecutive years, or E for one year, must submit a plan of corrective actions in the SEEMP (Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan), part III. The superintendent monitors the rating during the year and activates operational levers in good time (speed, trim, hull cleaning, energy efficiency).

The reduction factors against the 2019 reference line are adopted up to 2030: −5% in 2023, −7% in 2024, −9% in 2025, −11% in 2026 and, by resolution MEPC.400(83) of 11 April 2025, −13.625% in 2027, −16.250% in 2028, −18.875% in 2029, −21.500% in 2030. The second phase of the CII and SEEMP review, started at MEPC 84 and due to be completed by 2028, continues and may change the picture, but it does not make already adopted values undetermined. In the chart above it is the ship trajectory that is illustrative, not the required line.

The leap: the IMO Net-Zero Framework

MEPC 83 (April 2025) approved a draft IMO Net-Zero Framework with a GFI standard and global economic mechanism. The approved text covers ships of 5,000 GT and above, with exclusions: it is not yet an obligation in force.

The framework has two elements: a GHG Fuel Intensity standard (GFI) that progressively reduces the carbon intensity of fuel, and a pricing mechanism that charges for excess emissions and rewards zero/near-zero emission fuels, with an IMO Net-Zero Fund redistributing proceeds. The rules are structured as a new chapter of MARPOL Annex VI.

Net-Zero draft architecture: GFI standard and economic mechanism, not yet adopted.

ECAs and sulphur limits

Sulphur limits: 0.50% m/m globally and 0.10% in SOx ECAs when applicable; approved equivalents under regulation 4 are permitted, subject to local discharge restrictions.

• Baltic, North Sea, North America and US Caribbean: operational SOx ECAs. NOx Tier III depends on engine and construction dates; it does not automatically apply to all ships.
• Mediterranean: ECA SOx limit from 1 May 2025.
• Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea: amendments in force from 1 March 2026; 0.10% SOx limit from 1 March 2027. Check the regulation 13 NOx criteria separately.
• North-East Atlantic: MEPC.407(84), entry into force 1 September 2027, SOx application 1 September 2028; NOx follows the specified construction criteria.

For the superintendent this means planning the fuel changeover and its engine-room log entries, checking tank segregation and keeping the documentary evidence on board (bunker delivery notes, samples).

End of life: the Hong Kong Convention

The Hong Kong Convention entered into force on 26 June 2025. Existing in-scope ships require an IHM by 26 June 2030 or before earlier recycling; new ships follow their own regime. Article 3 includes exclusions such as ships below 500 GT and specified State ships. Regulation (EU) 1257/2013 has its own scope: IHM requirements already applied to in-scope EU-flag ships and third-country ships calling at EU ports. Maintain the inventory according to materials actually present, supplier documentation and verification requirements.

The European front: EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime

EU ETS: for covered maritime activities, surrender covers 40% of 2024 emissions, 70% of 2025 and 100% from 2026; allowances are due by 30 September of the following year. September 2026 therefore settles 70% of 2025 emissions, not 100% of 2026. CH₄ and N₂O enter from 2026. Subject to derogations, coverage is 100% for intra-EEA voyages and EEA port emissions, and 50% for voyages to/from external ports. Ordinary cargo/passenger coverage starts at 5,000 GT; offshore ships from 5,000 GT enter in 2027. MRV expansion does not automatically extend ETS.

FuelEU Maritime applies from 2025 to commercial passenger/cargo ships above 5,000 GT within the regulation’s geographic scope. It limits the well-to-wake GHG intensity of energy; pooling, banking and borrowing have specific conditions and do not replace ETS surrender. Check exclusions, derogations and territorial incorporation without automatically equating the EU with the entire EEA. Penalties depend on the remaining compliance deficit under the regulation.

Reporting: EU MRV and IMO DCS

Carbon pricing and intensity standards rest on a data chain the superintendent must govern as tightly as a survey. Two regimes coexist: the IMO DCS (ships of 5,000 GT and above; annual consumption by fuel type, distance travelled and hours under way) and the EU MRV (a wider scope: ships of 5,000 GT and above and, from 1 January 2025, also general cargo ships from 400 to below 5,000 GT and offshore ships of 400 GT and above, on EU/EEA voyages, with per-voyage and per-ship emission data; the EU ETS follows its own rules and timing).

• DCS: data to the Administration/authorised organisation by 31 March; Statement of Compliance by 31 May; the Administration transfers data to IMO within one month of issue, not simply on 30 June.
• MRV: verified reports by 31 March; the authority may bring this forward, but not before 28 February. Document of compliance on board by 30 June.
• FuelEU: report to verifier by 31 January; verified report and results in the database by 31 March (Article 16.5). The 30 April deadline concerns, in particular, borrowing and pool allocation, not first recording of verified results. FuelEU document by 30 June subject to Articles 22–23.
• EU ETS: surrender by 30 September for the preceding year.

The practical risk is not the deadline but data quality: bunker delivery notes and flowmeter readings must reconcile with the engine-room records, because that figure is what allowances are paid on and what the CII rating is calculated from. An inconsistency found at verification costs more than a year of careful recording.

Alternative fuels: an overview

EEXI: specified ship categories from 400 GT, with exceptions and verification also after a relevant conversion; not every ship indiscriminately. CII: specified categories from 5,000 GT, not the whole DCS population. SEEMP III corrective actions following three D years/one E year must be submitted for verification within one month of reporting attained CII and no later than five months after year-end (MARPOL VI/28).

Verification sources: MEPC.392(82); MARPOL VI/13–14 ↗ · IMO, MEPC 84 ↗ · FuelEU, Reg. (EU) 2023/1805, Arts 2, 15–16, 20–23 ↗ · MRV, Reg. (EU) 2015/757, Arts 2, 11–11a, 18 ↗ · EU ETS, Dir. 2003/87/EC, Arts 3ga–3gb, 12; Annex I ↗ · Hong Kong Convention, Art. 3; Reg. 5 ↗

Incident investigation and root cause analysis

Module objectiveConduct a structured investigation that reaches the underlying causes and closes with verified corrective action.

Every incident and every near-miss is valuable information. A structured investigation turns the event into prevention. The superintendent must conduct investigations that go beyond «operator blame» to organisational and latent causes.

The investigation process

• Securing the scene and immediate collection of evidence (facts, not opinions; objective data, testimony, recordings).
• Reconstruction of the sequence of events (timeline).
• Identification of immediate, contributing and root causes.
• Definition of corrective actions on the root cause, with owners and deadlines.
• Verification of effectiveness and sharing of lessons learned across the fleet.

Root cause analysis methods

The company SMS investigation is separate from the State safety investigation under the Casualty Investigation Code (MSC.255(84), Parts I–II mandatory through SOLAS XI-1/6). Preserve originals and traceability of copies; coordinate with the competent investigators. Five Whys and diagrams suggest hypotheses: causal findings need evidence, without forcing a single root cause.

Verification sources: ISM Code, §§1.1.10, 3–5, 9–10, 12–14 ↗

Digitalisation and emerging risks

Module objectiveAssess the use of condition monitoring, fleet analytics and remote surveys, and place cyber risk inside the SMS.

Technical management is changing shape: data, connectivity and new threats are redefining the superintendent's job. Those who master these tools gain more control and foresight; those who ignore them fall behind.

From data to decision

• Condition monitoring and IoT: sensors on critical machinery feed condition-based and predictive maintenance, reducing failures and downtime.
• Fleet performance & noon-data analytics: consumption, speed and weather data processed to optimise routes and reduce carbon intensity (with a direct impact on CII).
• Remote & digital surveys: some class verifications are carried out remotely, reducing waiting times and costs, within the limits allowed by the RO.

Cyber security on board

A connected ship is also a ship that can be attacked. IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) encourages Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in the Safety Management System (SMS); that expectation is verified within the ISM implementation of the company and its Administration, from the first annual DOC verification after 1 January 2021. The superintendent oversees the inventory of OT/IT systems, network segregation, access management, updates and crew training.

For newbuildings, IACS UR E26 and E27 also apply to ships contracted for construction on or after 1 July 2024: the first covers the cyber resilience of the ship as a whole, the second that of individual onboard systems and equipment. Anyone supervising a newbuilding finds them in the specification — not as good practice but as a class requirement.

Sensors enable monitoring but do not guarantee fewer failures: reliable data, thresholds and operational response are needed. For E26/E27 check ship type, UR revision and class rules; contract date alone is insufficient. Updated IMO guidance is MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.3 (2025).

Verification sources: MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.3; MSC.428(98) ↗

Insurance, claims and emergency response

Module objectiveKnow which cover responds to which event, which notifications to make in the first hour and how evidence is preserved.

The superintendent does not place the policies, but is the person who — when something goes wrong — either builds or destroys the evidence. Knowing who covers what, which notifications to make and how evidence is preserved is what separates a paid claim from a loss the company carries itself.

Who covers what

Off-hire and general average

Under a time charter the ship goes off-hire when an event listed in the clause prevents her from providing the agreed service. The argument is almost never about the principle but about the hours: start, end and cause must be documented with the log book, notification e-mails and technical evidence.

General average requires an extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure intentionally and reasonably made for common safety from peril. York-Antwerp Rules operate through contractual incorporation and applicable law: declaration, contribution and security do not automatically follow every casualty. Coordinate with the owner, average adjuster and advisers; distinguish a bond from an insurer’s guarantee and record expenditure separately.

The first hour after the event

• Safety of people and of the ship; everything else comes after.
• Notifications: owner, DPA, flag, class, P&I and — where there is pollution or a risk of it — the coastal authority under the SOPEP/SMPEP.
• Preservation of evidence: the VDR keeps the most recent hours in the capsule and a longer period in onboard memory, but it overwrites. The instruction to save the data must be given at once, in writing, and the copy kept dated and signed.
• Verified facts kept distinct from preliminary hypotheses: no speculation on causes, no unauthorised admission of liability, and no document reconstructed after the fact.
• A single chronological record of events and communications, opened in the first minute.

Salvage, ERS and emergency plans

In case of grounding, flooding or fire, a ship enrolled in an Emergency Response Service can receive round-the-clock support: residual stability and strength calculations on the lodged model, within hours. It is not automatic: it normally requires a contract, prior enrolment, and an up-to-date model and data. It must be checked in advance, not discovered on the day.

Salvage and assistance terms may be governed by the Lloyd's Open Form (no cure, no pay) or by other agreements; whether SCOPIC — a specific contractual regime of special compensation — applies must be checked against the contract and the clause in force, with P&I and advisers. The difference between commercial towage and salvage is not a matter of wording: it changes who pays, and how much.

United States trading: OPA-90

Depending on ship type, tonnage and activity, an approved Vessel Response Plan, a Qualified Individual reachable around the clock, contracts with qualified OSROs and the Certificate of Financial Responsibility may be required — the last generally for ships above 300 GT, with exceptions, and for ships of any tonnage engaged in lightering or transshipment of oil in the EEZ. Applicability must be checked case by case against 33 CFR and USCG guidance: where they apply they are conditions of entry, and no insurance cover makes up for them.

Cover depends on the policy, exclusions, deductibles and conditions: contractual off-hire does not equal an insured Loss of Hire claim. P&I may be mutual or fixed-premium. Also notify the H&M insurer/broker where relevant; do not delay urgent safety measures while awaiting a surveyor. Save VDR and other data immediately using the installed system, preserving originals and recording who, when, copying and custody.

Verification sources: CMI, York-Antwerp Rules, Rule A ↗